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Abstract
We consider a model where sellers make repeated attempts to sell
an object via two competing auction houses. An auction house that
attracts a seller runs a Vickrey auction among a random sample of
buyers and collects two fees: a listing fee and, if the object is sold, a
closing fee. We characterize equilibria and show that two non-identical
auction houses may coexist in equilibrium if the population of sellers
is suciently dierentiated in their time preferences. In such an equi-
librium impatient, \amateur" sellers choose the more popular (the one
that attracts more bidders) and more expensive auction house, while
patient, \professional" sellers choose the less popular and cheaper one.
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11 Introduction
This paper considers a model of Internet-style trade, where a seller cannot
deal directly with buyers, instead, the trade must be mediated. A media-
tor sets the rules of a trade procedure (an auction mechanism) and collects
fees from the traders. This is the case in Internet auctions where the role
of mediators is played by such giant commercial institutions as eBay and,
previously, Amazon and Yahoo.
In the last ten years, eBay took over more than fteen Internet auction
houses that operated on local as well as international markets.1 Moreover, its
main competitors, Yahoo and Amazon, discontinued their Internet auction
service (Yahoo on June 16, 2007 and Amazon on September 8, 2008), leaving
Naspers as, probably, the only serious player other than eBay on this market.2
The main motivation for this paper is the following question: Will one
auction house (e.g., eBay) eventually monopolize the Internet auction mar-
ket, or can competitors coexist on this market?
In our framework, two competing auction houses try to attract a single
seller drawn at random from a heterogeneous pool of sellers. The seller has
one object for sale and every bidder demands one object. We assume that
auction houses sell objects via Vickrey auction with reserve price and receive
revenue by charging sellers two fees: a listing fee, a xed amount paid by
a seller regardless of the auction outcome, and a closing fee, a percentage
of the closing price if the object is sold. Competing auction houses dier
1The list of eBay's acquisitions includes Up4Sale.com (US), Buttereld & Buttereld
(US), Alando (Germany), Half.com (US), Internet Auction Co. (South Korea), iBazar
(France), CARad.com, EachNet (China), Baazee.com (India), Marktplaats.nl (Nether-
lands), Shopping.com (US), Tradera (Sweden), StubHub (US), GittiGidiyor (Turkey),
StumbleUpon (Canada), Afterbuy (Germany), GMarket (South Korea).
2Naspers operates in 13 countries where eBay is not present or not a market leader and
includes such brands as Aucro (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine),
Allegro (Poland), QXL (Denmark, Norway, and, formerly, UK), Ricardo (Switzerland),
Molotok (Russia).
2in their number of bidders and service fees. Since sellers are heterogeneous
(characterized by a private discount factor and a private object value), a
seller's choice of an auction house depends on his type. There are three
important features in our model. First, auction fees are xed and publicly
known: once announced, they cannot be altered later on. Second, whenever a
seller fails to sell his object, he is allowed to oer it for (re-)auction again, as
many times as he wants. Third, in every auction the seller faces a dierent
set of bidders drawn from a large population. In addition, all players are
assumed to be risk neutral, and auction houses are at least as patient as the
sellers (in their preferences over time).
Our analysis provides a new insight regarding optimal selection of auction
fees. The rst result shows that a positive listing fee is never a best reply for
an auction house, and, consequently, in any equilibrium the listing fee must be
equal to zero. The intuition behind this result is that when an auction house
is more patient than a seller, there is a distortion between their interests
that is minimized when the listing fee is zero. Thus, we show that an auction
house's policy is eectively one-dimensional: it is the choice of its closing fee
only.
Second, we characterize Bayesian Nash equilibria in our model and show
that there exists at most one equilibrium which, depending on the model
parameters, may be one of the following types: (contestable) monopoly or
market segmentation. A monopoly equilibrium arises if the pool of sellers
is not too dierentiated. It is a result of a standard Bertrand competition,
where a more popular auction house (that attracts more bidders) sets fees
low enough that sellers of every type will be attracted to that auction house,
and the competitor is forced to \leave" the market.
A contestable monopoly is probably the most expected situation on the
market. However, if sellers are suciently dierentiated, a market segmen-
tation equilibrium obtains, where auction houses \split the market." This
3situation takes place if the more popular auction house can obtain higher
expected payos by attracting only sellers of one type (rather than all types,
as it is in the contestable monopoly). This allows its competitor to set low
positive fees, attract sellers of the other type, and obtain a positive expected
payo as well. This equilibrium is a result of \product dierentiation" where
sellers are discriminated on the basis of their time preferences. Less patient
sellers are naturally attracted to the more popular auction house that pro-
vides a larger number of bidders immediately. In contrast, more patient
sellers are not so constrained by time, so that they can aord to re-auction
their objects a few times on the less popular but cheaper auction house.
Ellison, Fudenberg, and M obius (2004) in a closely related article (see
also Moldovanu, Sela, and Shi, 2008) nd that whenever two auction houses
co-exist in equilibrium, the \law of one price" (i.e., the same expected closing
price and the same buyer/seller ratio across competing auctions) should hold.
This result relies on the assumption that bidders can freely choose between
auction houses. Contrarily to Ellison, Fudenberg, and M obius (2004), Brown
and Morgan (2009) demonstrate in eld experiments that eBay prices were
consistently higher than those on Yahoo, and eBay attracted more buyers
per seller. In attempt to explain this observation, we depart from Ellison,
Fudenberg, and M obius' (2004) setting by assuming that bidders are im-
mobile, i.e., the number of bidders that an auction house attracts is given
exogenously. There are other reasons why such an assumption may be more
plausible. On the one hand, customers of one auction house may be unaware
of existence of a competitor. On the other hand, in reality an auction house
takes certain actions to make participants accustomed to its features and
design in order to make transition to a competitor costly, for instance, using
bonuses for participation or tracking reputation. Our market segmentation
suggests an explanation for Brown and Morgan's (2009) ndings.
There are two other important assumptions in our model: innite re-
4auction attempts for a seller and a new set of bidders in every auction.
A seller has a re-auction option in real life and this option has essential
impact on players' strategic behavior, as noted, for example, by Fudenberg
at al. (1985), Milgrom (1987), McAfee and Vincent (1997), Horstmann and
LaCasse (1997), Gupta and Lebrun (1999). The second assumption { that
the seller faces a dierent set of bidders drawn from a large population in
each period { is reasonable in the context of Internet auctions where a typical
auction runs several days, and most of the bids are received in the very last
day. Our model can be considered as an instance for many similar sales
on Internet where a buyer's objective is to purchase an object of a certain
kind, not to purchase an object from a specic seller. A buyer who fails
to buy an object from a seller can obtain it elsewhere and therefore has no
reason to return to this particular seller. Hence, the seller who re-auctions
his object believes that bidders who participated in his previous auctions
would not come again. In contrast, a large part of the existing literature
on auctions with resale assumes that there is the same set of bidders in all
auctions.3 This implies two dierences from our model. In models with
a possibility of one-time after-auction resale, each bidder places a positive
probability on buying in a secondary market if she loses the auction (Gupta
and Lebrun, 1999; Haile 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003; Zheng 2002; Krishna, 2002,
Section 4.4; Calzolari and Pavan 2006; Garatt and Tr oger 2006; Pagnozzi
2007). In models with re-auctioning, the optimal reserve price declines due
to Bayesian updating of the distribution of bidders' private values after every
auction (Fudenberg at al. 1985; McAfee and Vincent 1997). The latter eect
does not appear in our model, because we assume that the auction houses
3The exceptions are Haile (1999, 2001) who allows new bidders (in particular, all new
bidders) to participate in a re-auction, and Matros and Zapechelnyuk (2008) who consider
a more restrictive setting with a monopoly auction house and a unidimensional type of
sellers. Dierent, but related settings are considered by Bikhchandani and Huang (1989),
Bose and Deltas (1999, 2007) and Calzolari and Pavan (2006) who model resale to a given
secondary market where the original bidders need not participate.
5cannot change their fee policy during the game. As a result, the optimal
seller's strategy (the choice of the auction house and the reserve price) is
stationary.
In our model a winning bidder is not allowed to re-auction the object.
This is a simplifying assumption which can be relaxed without any eect on
the results: since a new set of bidders arrives in each period, there is no issue
of signaling and information communication for the bidders between periods
(in contrast to Haile 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003; Zheng 2002; and others). If a
winning bidder becomes a seller, she would face ex-ante the same environment
in the next-period auction. The expected revenue from a new auction is not
higher than her current use value, thus she prefers to consume the object.
This contrasts our results, in particular, to Zheng (2002) who assumes that
a xed, nite set of bidders is involved in trade, where, despite that bidders
are ex-ante symmetric, the initial seller and the winning bidder face dierent
trade environments, and the winner may benet from a re-auction.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is described in Section 2.
In Sections 3 and 4 we depict the optimal behavior of the seller and auction
houses. Section 5 characterizes all equilibria. Section 6 concludes. The
Appendix contains omitted proofs.
2 The Model
Let N be a large (innite) population of bidders and M be a large (innite)
population of sellers. Every bidder i 2 N is characterized by her private use
value vi 2 [v;v] of the object. All private use values are independent and
identically distributed according to distribution function F. Every seller s 2
M is characterized by two independent private parameters: his use value vs 2
[v;v] (sellers' use values are independent and identically distributed according
to distribution function Fs) and discount factor s. We assume that s has
6either low (L) or high (H) value with probability  and (1 ) respectively,
where 0 < L  H < 1 and  2 [0;1]. We also assume that functions F
and Fs are dierentiable and have positive density on (v;v), and, in addition,
satisfy some technical conditions. Namely, F satises the monotonic hazard
rate condition (e.g., Myerson 1981) and Fs satises a similar condition, that
is, z  
1 F(z)
f(z) and Fs(z) (v  z)fs(z) are strictly increasing on (v;v), where
f and fs denote the corresponding density functions. Further, there are two
auction houses j = 1;2, each of which is characterized by the number of
bidders nj that it attracts during an auction. Distribution functions F and
Fs and parameters , L, H, n1 and n2 are common knowledge. We also
assume that all players are risk neutral.
The timing of the game is as follows. In period 0, the two auction houses
simultaneously announce fees for all subsequent auctions: listing fees, cj  0,
and closing fees, a fraction j 2 [0;1] of the closing price. The fees are
commitments that cannot be altered in later periods. Then a seller s is
drawn at random from population M.
In every period t = 1;2;::: (as long as the object is not sold or consumed),
the seller either consumes the object (and the game ends) or chooses an
auction house j 2 f1;2g to place his object for sale. In the latter case,
the seller announces a reserve price, and a Vickrey auction is run among a
random sample of nj bidders from population N. As a result of the auction,
the object is transferred to a winner (the highest bidder), who pays to the
seller the price equal to the second highest bid (or the reserve price), or the
object is returned to the seller, if no bid is above the reserve price. Regardless
of the auction outcome, the seller pays to auction house j the listing fee, cj,
and, in addition, if the object is sold, the closing fee, fraction j of the closing
price. If the object is sold, the game ends, otherwise it proceeds to the next
period.
73 Seller's Decision Problem
In this section we describe and solve seller's decision problem. Consider a
seller with use value vs 2 [0;1] and discount factor s 2 fL;Hg. Given the
stationarity of the environment, we will only examine seller's time-invariant
(Markov) strategies.
The seller faces the fees of both auction houses, (c1;1) and (c2;2), and
makes the following decisions. First, he makes an allocation decision (1;2),
where j is the probability that the object is auctioned o on auction house
j = 1;2, and 1   1   2 is the probability that the object is consumed,
1;2 2 [0;1], 1 + 2  1. Second, for each auction house j, the seller
chooses a reserve price rj that he would use had he chosen auction house j
to auction o his object.4
Since we assume that the object is being sold via Vickrey auction, every
bidder's dominant strategy is to bid her true use value (e.g., Krishna 2002),
thus the only parameter that aects the expected revenue from the auction
is the reserve price. Let us analyze how the seller chooses the revenue-
maximizing reserve price.
Suppose that the seller chooses auction house j for auctioning the object.
For every reserve price rj denote by Pj(rj) the probability that the object is
sold on auction house j, and by xj(rj) the expected closing price, that is, the
expected payment of the winning bidder conditional on the event that the
object is sold. Denote by uj(rj;u) the expected seller's revenue from the
auction j, where u is the highest continuation payo that the seller expects
to obtain in the next period if the object is not sold.5 Thus,
uj(rj;u
) =  cj + (1   j)Pj(rj)xj(rj) + (1   P(rj))su
: (1)
4A description of the seller's strategy must include the decision about the reserve price
in auction house j whether or not the object is auctioned at that auction house.
5We assume that the seller does not derive any utility from the object before it is sold
or consumed.







Lemma 1 For every pair of auction fees (cj;j) and every u 2 [v;  v], there
exists a unique solution rj(u) 2 [v;  v] of the decision problem (2). It is a
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The proof is in the Appendix.
Note that equation (3) is a standard rst-order condition in a Vickrey
auction with a reserve price (see, e.g., Krishna, 2002). The uniqueness of the
solution follows from the hazard rate condition stipulating that z  
1 F(z)
f(z) is
a strictly increasing function.
Let us now consider the seller's allocation decision (1;2). The seller
makes an allocation decision (to consume the object or to auction it o on
auction house 1 or 2) which maximizes his expected payo. Note that since
in every period the seller faces ex-ante the same environment, if he chooses
auction house j once, then he will choose it in all periods until the object is
sold.
Let u
j be the expected seller's payo if he sells the object at auction house
j in all periods. From (1) it follows that u



















The next lemma states that equation (4) has a unique solution.
9Lemma 2 The mapping uj(rj();) has a unique xed point.
The proof is in the Appendix.
The seller chooses (
1;











2 + (1   1   2)vs: (5)
We say that a seller prefers auction house i to auction house j if u
i 
u
j. Thus, the seller auctions the object o at a preferred auction house
and receives maxfu
1;u
2g whenever this revenue exceeds his use value vs,
otherwise, he consumes the object and receives vs.
Note that the expected payo from auction j, u
j, and the optimal reserve
price rj(u
j) do not depend on the seller's use value, vs, but they depend
on the seller's discount factor s. Indeed, a more patient seller chooses a
higher reserve price and receives a higher expected revenue from the auction.
Therefore, sellers with the same discount factor have the same preference
over auction houses, and only sellers with dierent discount factors may po-
tentially prefer dierent auction houses. With a slight abuse of terminology,
we will refer to a more (less) patient seller with discount factor, H (L), as
an H-type (respectively, L-type) seller.
4 Auction Houses
Seller's behavior as a function of auction houses' fees was described in the
previous section. In this section, we consider how auction houses choose their
fees.
4.1 Payos
In auction house j = 1;2, in each period a set of nj bidders is randomly
drawn to participate in the auction. The number of bidders nj is xed and
10commonly known.6 We assume that both auction houses have the same
discount factor  2 (0;1] and are more patient than sellers,   H( L).7
This assumption is economically justied: it is standard in the literature to
assume that a business (an internet auction house) is more patient than an
individual (a seller).
Fix auction houses' fees a1 = (c1;1) and a2 = (c2;2), the seller's use
value vs and his discount factor ,  2 fL;Hg. Denote by 
j(a1;a2) the
probability that a -type seller chooses auction house j, by u
j(aj) the seller's
expected payo from auctioning the object o on auction house j, and by
r
j(aj) the optimal reserve price, j = 1;2. The expected payo of auction
house j conditional on that a -type seller has chosen it to sell the object is
w










The next lemma shows that the above equation has a unique solution.
Lemma 3 For every aj = (cj;j) 2 R+  [0;1] and every  2 fL;Hg, there
exists a unique solution, w
j(aj), of equation (6).
The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 2 and thus omitted.
The unconditional payo  wj(a1;a2) of auction house j is given by the
product of the conditional payo described above and the probability that a
seller of each type chooses auction house j for selling the object









Equation (7) shows that each auction house faces the following trade-o:
lower fees lead, on the one hand, to a higher probability of attracting a seller
6The results can be generalized to the case where the number of bidders nj is random,
drawn from the same distribution in each period. Indeed, all that matters here is that
a seller makes the decision of auctioning his object before nj is drawn, thus his decision
depends the distribution of the number of bidders (which is constant across periods), but
not on its realizations.
7The assumption that auction houses share the same discount factor is not critical and
can be relaxed without aecting the results.
11(or even to stealing a seller from the competitor), but on the other hand, to
a lower revenue from the attracted seller.
4.2 Closing-Fee Auctions
This section addresses and partially answers one of the main questions of
this paper: What are the optimal auction house fees? We will show that if
an auction house makes a positive prot in an equilibrium, the listing fee in
that equilibrium must be zero.
Theorem 1 Let (c1;1) and (c2;2) be arbitrary fees of the auction houses.
If auction house i receives a positive expected payo and ci > 0, then (ci;i)
is not a best reply of auction house i to the fees (cj;j), j 6= i.
The proof is in the Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Suppose that a seller has
chosen auction house i. Since the seller is less patient than the auction
house, he will always choose his reserve price lower than the reserve price
which maximizes the expected payo of the auction house.8 Since ci >
0, auction house i can simultaneously increase closing fee i and decrease
listing fee ci such that the seller's expected revenue does not change, but
his \virtual continuation value" svs
1 i increases. By equation (3), a higher
\virtual continuation value" leads to a higher reserve price, which in turn
increases the expected revenue of the auction house.
It immediately follows from Theorem 1 that if an auction house has a
positive expected payo in an equilibrium, then its listing fee must be equal
to zero. However, in an equilibrium where auction house i has zero payo
8The assumption that the auction house is at least as patient as sellers is important.
The result in Theorem 1 need not hold if a sucient fraction of the sellers' population is
more patient than the auction house.
12(and thus no deviation can lead to a positive payo), every pair of fees
(ci;i) is a best reply, that is, all strategies of auction house i lead to the
same zero payo. To simplify notations and characterization of equilibria,
we will assume that if auction house i has zero payo in an equilibrium, then
ci = 0. This assumption and Theorem 1 give the following corollary.
Corollary 1 In every equilibrium the listing fees of both auction houses are
equal to zero.
Corollary 1 allows us to x listing fees at zero and describe the auction
houses' strategies as the choice of closing fees only. In what follows, we
will assume that the listing fees are zero. Thus, the notation for a strategy
aj = (cj;j) of auction house j will be replaced by j and understood as aj =
(0;j). Therefore, from (7), the unconditional payo  wj(a1;a2) =  wj(1;2)
of auction house j can be rewritten as









4.3 Dierent Auction Houses
We say that auction house i is more popular than auction house j if it attracts
more bidders, i.e., ni > nj. Without loss of generality, we assume that
n1  n2.
Since the total expected revenue from an auction depends on the number
of bidders, it is easy to see that selling an object on the more popular auction
yields higher expected closing price. Thus, if two auction houses charge equal
fees, any seller (whether H-type or L-type) will prefer the more popular
auction house, and hence the less popular one attracts no sellers and receives
zero payo.
Suppose that the auction houses are equally popular, n1 = n2. Since in
an equilibrium auction houses compete only in closing fees, they are engaged
13in the classic Bertrand competition: an auction house with a lower closing
fee is more attractive to a seller of any type. It immediately follows that
closing fees must be equal to zero in an equilibrium.
Proposition 1
(i) If the auction houses are equally popular, n1 = n2, then there exists a
unique equilibrium where all fees are equal to zero, (c1;1) = (0;0) = (c2;2):
(ii) If auction house 1 is more popular, n1 > n2, then it sets a positive closing
fee in equilibrium, 1 > 0.
The proof is in the Appendix.
Part (i) of Proposition 1 completely characterizes the equilibria in the
case of equally popular auction houses. In what follows, we will analyze the
more complicated case, n1 > n2. In order to understand how the sellers of
dierent types choose between auction houses that are not equally popular,
consider the following diagram (Fig. 1).
Figure 1 illustrates the indierence curves of L and H types of sellers for
the case of n1 > n2. For every closing fee 2 of auction house 2, let (2)
denote the critical level of 1 such that with these fees a -type seller,  =
L;H, is indierent between the two auction houses. The graph f((2);2) :
2 2 [0;1]g represents the indierence curve of a -type seller. Note that
at the point (1;2) = (1;1) the indierence curves for both seller types
coincide, since in this case the auction houses claim the entire surplus, leaving
sellers with zero expected revenue, regardless of their types. Two curves
L(2) and H(2) divide the closing fee space, 1  2, into three areas:
A is the area where 1 is too high relative to 2, so that all sellers prefer
auction house 2;
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Figure 1: Indierence curves of L and H types of sellers
C is the area where 2 is too high relative to 1, so that all sellers prefer
auction house 1.
It is important to note that the more popular auction house 1 can always
guarantee to attract L-type sellers by setting its closing fee 1  00
1. Fur-
thermore, it can always guarantee to attract all sellers by setting its closing
fee 1  0
1, no matter what closing fee 2 is chosen by auction house 2. In
contrast, the less popular auction house 2 cannot guarantee to attract any
type of sellers.
It is clear from Figure 1 that if an H-type seller is indierent between two
auction houses, then L-type seller prefers the more popular auction house 1.
The next proposition shows that this statement holds in general.
15Proposition 2 For every pair of fees, (1;2) 6= (1;1), if an H-type seller
is indierent between two auction houses, then L-type seller prefers the more
popular auction house 1. Formally, if n1 > n2, then H(2) < L(2) for
every 2 < 1.
The proof is in the Appendix.
Intuitively, for an L-type seller (the impatient one), the possibility to
obtain a higher revenue right now is the most important, and thus he receives
a higher payo from the more popular auction house. To see this, imagine
the extremely impatient seller, L = 0, who obtains utility only from the
current-period sale. In this case, only the current number of bidders on the
auction matters for him. In contrast, a more patient seller can aord to
wait and try to sell the object more than once, thus, eventually facing more
bidders over time, even if there are a few of them in the current period.
5 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section we will show that if auction houses are not equally popular,
n1 > n2, then there are three types of equilibria: monopoly, contestable
monopoly, and market segmentation.
5.1 Monopoly
Suppose that auction house 1 is much more popular than auction house 2, so
that auction house 1 is a monopoly on the market. For illustration, imagine
the extreme case, n2 = 0. In this extreme case a seller with use value vs
and discount factor  ,  = H;L, will never choose auction house 2, i.e.,

2(1;2) = 0 for every (1;2). Furthermore, the seller chooses auction
16house 1 (as opposed to consuming the object) if u
1(1) > vs.9 Hence, for a
given closing fee 1, the probability that a seller of type  auctions the object
o is equal to the probability that vs < u







From (8), the expected payo of the monopolist is


































The following lemma helps to establish uniqueness of the solution.






is strictly concave in i.
The proof is in the Appendix. A solution of (9) is unique, since the sum
of concave functions is concave. We will refer to this solution, denoted by
M
1 2 [0;1], as the monopoly closing fee. Further, the equilibrium where
auction house 1 sets the monopoly closing fee and attracts all sellers will be
called the monopoly equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Let n1 > n2. The monopoly equilibrium exists if and only if

M
1  H(0): (10)
9A tie, vs = u
1(1), is a zero-probability event and thus can be ignored in the analysis.
17Proof. Condition (10) means that H-type sellers prefer auction house
1 when 2 = 0. From Proposition 2, H(0) < L(0). Thus, condition (10)
implies that both types of sellers prefer auction house 1 when 2 = 0 (and
even more so at any higher closing fee of auction house 2), and hence, setting
the monopoly closing fee is the best reply for auction house 1.
Conversely, if a monopoly equilibrium exists, then after setting the monopoly
closing fee, M
1 , auction house 1 attracts sellers of all types for any closing
fee of auction house 2, including 2 = 0. Therefore, M
1  H(0): End of
Proof.
The following notation will be useful later. Consider two extreme cases
 = 1 and  = 0. In the rst case, all sellers are L-type and auction house i







i (i)  Fs(u
L
i (i)): (11)
The unique maximizer of (11), L
i , will be called the L closing fee of auction







i (i)  Fs(u
H
i (i)): (12)
The unique maximizer of (12), H
i , will be called the H closing fee of auction
house i.
5.2 Contestable Monopoly
Let n1 > n2 > 0. Consider an equilibrium where the more popular auction
house 1 sets a positive closing fee less than the monopoly fee, attracts sellers
of all types, and receives a positive expected payo, while auction house 2
attracts no sellers and receives zero payo. This situation is a contestable
monopoly: the more popular auction house 1 is a monopolist who is forced
to set the closing fee low enough (lower than the monopoly closing fee) to
18keep the other auction house from \entering the market" (setting a closing
fee above zero) and obtaining a positive expected payo. In a contestable
monopoly equilibrium the more popular auction house 1 sets 1 = H(0) <
M
1 and attracts both types of sellers, or 
2(1;2) = 0 for each  = H;L.
Proposition 4 Let n1 > n2. A contestable monopoly equilibrium exists if
and only if and only if

M
1 > H(0) (13)
and







Proof. Suppose that auction houses' closing fees are (H(0);0). Con-
dition (13) means that H-type sellers prefer auction house 2 under the
monopoly fee M
1 , hence this is not the monopoly equilibrium. Condition
(14) mean that auction house 1 has no incentive to increase its closing fee
to the level that would maximize the revenue from L-type sellers only (com-
pletely ignoring H-type sellers); clearly, auction house 1 cannot benet by a
reduction 1, and action house 2 cannot benet by an increase of 2.
Conversely, suppose a contestable monopoly equilibrium exists. In such
an equilibrium, to attract sellers of all types, auction house 1 sets its clos-
ing fee at most H(0), and (13) must hold, otherwise auction house 1 could
have beneted by setting closing fee M
1 and obtaining the monopoly equilib-
rium prot. Similarly, (14) must hold, otherwise auction house 1 could have
beneted by setting closing fee L
1. End of Proof.
Proposition 4 demonstrates that if auction house 1 is more popular than
auction house 2 and cannot charge closing fee above H(0) (because otherwise
H-type and maybe even L-type sellers would switch to auction house 2)
a contestable monopoly equilibrium arises with the closing fees (1;2) =
(H(0);0) and 
2(H(0);0) = 0 for each  = H;L.
195.3 Market Segmentation
A contestable monopoly is a situation that is natural to see in our model
where two dierent auction houses compete in prices for sellers. However,
we show that this is not the only equilibrium outcome for competing auction
houses.
Suppose that condition (14) does not hold. It means that auction house 1
can obtain a higher payo if it charges a closing fee above H(0) and attracts
only L-type sellers, than if it charges closing fee equal to H(0) and attracts
all types of sellers. This can happen, for instance, when the mass of H-type
sellers in the population is small enough. Now, auction house 2 can also
raise its closing fee to collect a positive revenue from H-type sellers. Thus,
the market is split into two segments where each auction house attracts one
type of sellers and receives positive expected prot. An equilibrium where the
L-type sellers prefer the more popular auction house 1 and the H-type sellers
prefer the less popular auction house 2 will be called a market segmentation
equilibrium.10
Proposition 5 In a market segmentation equilibrium the following holds:
(i) Each auction house sets a monopoly fee on the respective market segment,
i.e., 1 = L
1 and 2 = H





















10Note that the opposite situation, where the L-type sellers prefer the less popular auc-
tion house 2 and the H-type sellers prefer the more popular auction house 1, is impossible
by Proposition 2.
20(ii) A payo of auction house j depends only on its own auction fees and is
given by












2 (2)  Fs(u
H
2 (2)):
Part (i) of the proposition shows that a market segmentation equilibrium
can exist only inside area B (Figure 1); part (ii) shows that each auction
house receives the monopoly payo on the respective market segment. Note
that since the monopoly fees L
1 and H
2 are unique, if a market segmentation
equilibrium exists, it must be unique.
5.4 Characterization of Equilibria
The following theorem summarizes the above results in Section 5 and com-
pletes the characterization of equilibria.
Theorem 2 There exists at most one equilibrium.
If n1 = n2, then equilibrium closing fees are (1;2) = (0;0).
If n1 > n2, then the equilibrium is either monopoly, contestable monopoly, or
market segmentation equilibrium.
Theorem 2 demonstrates that if an equilibrium exists, it must be one
of the types we have discussed. Furthermore, it is unique11 since each of
the equilibrium types is uniquely dened. Note that since conditions for
existence of the monopoly, contestable monopoly, and market segmentation
equilibrium are mutually exclusive and do not cover the entire set of param-
eters, it follows that generally an equilibrium (in pure strategies) need not
exist.
11Given our assumption that if an auction house receives zero prot in equilibrium, it
sets zero fees.
216 Conclusion
We study competition between two auction houses that attract sellers by
optimal choice of listing and closing fees. We characterize Bayesian Nash
equilibria and show that there exists at most one equilibrium which, depend-
ing on the model parameters, may be one of the following types: Bertrand
competition, monopoly, contestable monopoly, or market segmentation.
Our paper is an important complement to the existing literature on com-
peting auction houses (Ellison, Fudenberg, and M obius, 2004; Moldovanu,
Sela, and Shi, 2008) where the result is that even though two auction houses
can co-exist in equilibrium, the \law of one price" (i.e., the expected closing
price is the same in both auction houses) should hold and the buyer/seller
ratio should be constant across auction houses.
In a eld experiment, Brown and Morgan (2009) demonstrate that eBay
prices have been consistently higher than those on Yahoo, and eBay attracted
more buyers per seller. In contrast to previous theoretical models, our model
helps to explain this observation. It happens in the market segmentation
equilibrium where highly popular eBay attracts impatient sellers and smaller
auction houses attract more patient sellers.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Rewrite (1) as follows,
uj(rj;u
























22The result follows from Lemma 5 below with z = su
1 j.
Lemma 5 For every z  0, expression Pj(r)(xj(r) z) is strictly quasicon-









= z; if z <  v  





 =  v; if z   v  
1   F( v)
f( v)
:
The result is standard in the literature (e.g., Krishna 2002, Ch. 2.5) and
thus the proof is omitted.
Proof of Lemma 2

















=  cj + su
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Note that the seller auctions o her object on auction house j only if
cj < (1   j)max
r [Pj(r)xj(r)]: (16)
It means that j < 1. After dividing both sides by (1   j) and rearranging
the terms in (15), we obtain














23Note that from (16) the left-hand side is smaller (greater) than the right-
hand side at u
j = 0 (u
j = 1). Since the left-hand side is increasing and the
right-hand side is decreasing in u
j (recall that Pj() and xj() are nonnega-
tive), equation (17) has a unique solution. End of Proof.
Proof of Theorem 1
Consider arbitrary strategies of auction houses a1 = (c1;1) and a2 = (c2;2).
Suppose that ci > 0 and  wi(ai;aj) > 0, i = 1 or 2. Since  wi(ai;aj) > 0,
auction house i attracts a positive measure of sellers, H
i (ai;aj)+L
i (ai;aj) >
0. Suppose that strategy ai is auction house i's best reply to the strategy aj,
that is, for every strategy a0
i = (c0
i;0
i),  wi(ai;aj)   wi(a0
i;aj).
Recall that the payo of -type seller,  = H;L, is given by
u

i =  ci + (1   i)Pi(r
)xi(r

















i = ci + iPi(r
)xi(r




















Note that this sum does not depend on the auction house i's fees directly,
only via the seller's choice of the reserve price r. We will show now that,
whenever ci > 0, the sum of the seller's and auction house's payos is strictly
increasing in r in a small neighborhood of r. Further, we will show that there
exists a change of fees, an increase in i and a simultaneous decrease in ci
24that shifts up the reserve price, thus increasing in the sum of the payos and
making auction house i strictly better o.
Lemma 6 If ci > 0, then for each type  = H;L there exists a neighborhood
of r where W 
i () is strictly increasing.
Proof. After rearranging the terms of (21), we obtain
W










Let r be the reserve price that maximizes W 











and, furthermore, W 
i (r) is strictly quasiconcave. Hence W 
i (r) is strictly
increasing in r whenever r < r.





(1   i)Pi(r)xi(r)   ci
1   (1   Pi(r))
:






1   (1   Pi(r))
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(1   i)Pi(r)xi(r)   ci
1   (1   Pi(r))
+ 
iPi(r)xi(r) + ci
1   (1   Pi(r))
 
Pi(r)xi(r)









(1   i)Pi(r)xi(r)   ci







The last inequality is due to the assumption that ci  0 and it is strict





1 i whenever ci > 0.
25Since z 
1 F(z)
f(z) is strictly increasing, it follows that r < r from (19) and
(22). Hence, W(r) is strictly increasing in some neighborhood of r. End of
Proof.
We continue with the proof of Theorem 1. Consider a hypothetical sit-
uation where auction house i can choose a dierent pair of fees, a0
i, only for
the current period, while keeping the original fees, ai, in the next and further
periods (thus aecting only payos from this period, but not continuation
payos). By the one-period deviation principle, if no choice of a0
i in the cur-
rent period can lead to an increase in i's prot, neither can any change of
fees in all periods.
Let 0
i be a closing fee in a small neighborhood of i, 0
i > i. Since the
fees will be changed only in the current period, the continuation payo of a
-type seller, u
i, and the continuation payo of auction house i conditional
on the interaction with -type seller, w
i, remain unchanged. By (19) and
by the hazard rate assumption, the reserve price under the new closing fee,
r0
, is strictly greater than the original reserve price, r, and by Lemma 6,
W 
i (r0
) > W 
i (r). Let " be a small positive number such that






i (r);  = H;L:
Consider fees (c0
i;0
i) such that the listing fee 0  c0
i < ci and such that the
expected payo of auction house i is increased by " in comparison with fees
(ci;i). Since the total payo increase is W 
i (r0
)   W 
i (r), it follows that
the seller's payo must also increase. Note that, since only current-period
fees are changed, the payos of auction house i and the seller are linear in
c0
i (it is a simple redistribution of the revenue). Hence, for every measures
of H-type and L-type sellers, H
i (ai;aj) and L
i (ai;aj), the auction house can
guarantee to obtain at least " more revenue, which is a contradiction that
the initial fees (ci;i) are optimal. End of Proof.
26Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Part (i). Suppose that n1 = n2. Then a seller of any type prefers the
auction house with a lower closing fee. If, say, 1 > 2, then auction house 2
attracts sellers of both types, H-type and L-type, and it can protably deviate
by setting a slightly higher closing fee (but still below 1). If 1 = 2 > 0,
then the sellers are indierent between the auction houses, and an auction
house that attracts not all sellers can protably deviate by setting a slightly
lower closing fee.
Part (ii). Suppose that n1 > n2 and 1 = 0. Then a seller of any type
strictly prefers auction house 1 (even when 2 = 0), and thus auction house
1 can protably deviate by setting a slightly higher fee. End of Proof.
Proof of Proposition 2












; j = 1;2 and  = H;L:
Then, u
j = (1   j)~ u


















Dividing both sides of (1) by 1   j and maximizing the left-hand side











It follows from Lemma 2 that the above equation has a unique solution ~ u
j.
Note that ~ u
j does not depend on j, and neither does the optimal reserve
price r
j. Also, since n1 > n2, we have P1(r) > P2(r) and x1(r) > x2(r) for
every r, and it is straightforward to show that ~ u
1 > ~ u
2 and r
1 > r
2,  = H;L.
27Dene
Q(nj;z) = max
r [Pj(r)xj(r) + (1   Pj(r))z]: (24)
Thus we have ~ u
j = Q(nj;~ u
j). Note that function Q(nj;z) satises the






whenever n1 > n2 and z1 > z2. To see this, take the partial derivative of Q
with respect to z. By the Envelope Theorem, it is equal to 1   Pj(r), where
r is the maximizer of (24). Since Pj(r) is strictly increasing in the number of
bidders (see Proof of Lemma 5), the submodularity of Q is immediate. Let
z1 = H~ uH
1 and z2 = L~ uL
2. Using ~ uH
1 > ~ uL
1 > ~ uL
2 and ~ uH
1 > ~ uH
2 > ~ uL
2, we
obtain inequality (23). End of Proof.
Proof of Lemma 4
Solving (18) for u





1   (1   Pi(r))
:









1   (1   Pi(r))
:
By the argument provided in Proof of Proposition 2, we know that ~ uj and
r are independent of i, and hence u
i(i) = (1  i)~ u
j is linear in i. Also,






1   (1   Pi(r))
;
i.e., w
i(i) = i ~ w
i, where ~ w





i(i)) = i ~ w

i  Fs((1   i)~ u

j):





i  Fs(z)   i ~ w

i  ~ u


















Since by assumption on Fs (see Section 2) expression [Fs(z)   ( v   z)fs(z)]
is strictly increasing in z, its derivative satises
2fs(z)   ( v   z)f
0
s(z) > 0
and, furthermore, this inequality holds for every z  ~ u
j even after we replace
 v by ~ u
j (as ~ u
j   v). Thus Fs(z)   (~ u
j   z)fs(z) is also strictly increasing in
z  ~ u




Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. To prove part (i), we need to show that the reverse segmentation,
where L-type sellers prefer auction house 2 and H-type sellers prefer auction
house 1, cannot occur in equilibrium. This is immediate by Proposition 2,
according to which, for every pair of fees, H-type sellers prefer auction house
1 only if L-type sellers also prefer auction house 1.
Part (ii). Consider, say, auction house 1. By part (i), the best-reply
fee is an interior solution of the problem of nding the best fee facing the
population of L-type sellers only. But this solution is equal to the unique
auction fee on the monopoly market with only L-type sellers, L
1. End of
Proof.
Proof of Theorem 2
Equilibria in the case of n1 = n2 are fully characterized by Proposition 1.
29Suppose that n1 > n2. We described three types of equilibria, monopoly,
contestable monopoly, and market segmentation equilibrium and showed that
if an equilibrium exists, it is unique. It remains to show that no other equi-
libria may exist.









First, assume that 
j 2 f0;1g for every j = 1;2 and every  = H;L. Note
that s is a monopoly or contestable monopoly equilibrium if H
2 = L
2 = 0.
Since n1 > n2, clearly, H
1 = L
1 = 0 cannot occur in equilibrium, as auction
house 1 can charge low enough closing fee to attract sellers (see Figure 1).
Next, note that if H
1 = 0 and L
2 = 0, s is a market segmentation equilibrium,
and H
2 = 0 and L
1 = 0 cannot occur in equilibrium by Proposition 2.
Finally, suppose that 0 < 
j < 1 for some j = 1;2 and some  = H;L,
that is, a -type seller is indierent between two auction houses (recall our
assumption that if the seller is indierent between auctioning the object
or consuming it, he consumes with probability 1). Then s cannot be an
equilibrium: by Proposition 1 (ii), at least one auction house receives positive
prot and thus it can attract -type sellers with probability one by marginally
reducing its closing fee. End of Proof.
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